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1 Introduction
The measurement of probabilistic beliefs of traders has become increasingly common
both in academia and in practice of prediction (Manski 2004, Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004,
Surowiecki 2005, Armantier and Treich 2013). In particular, prediction markets are now
considered as one of the most efficient tool to elicit people’s beliefs.1 They have been
repeatedly used to predict the outcome of political elections, like with the Iowa electronic
market (www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/). They are also increasingly used by private companies
like Microsoft, Google and Chevron for instance to elicit their employees’ beliefs about
future sales or industry trends.
Technically, prediction markets are simple financial markets in which traders bet on the
outcomes of uncertain events. Asset prices in prediction markets are typically interpreted
as probabilities. For instance, Arrow et al. (2008) introduce prediction markets as follows:
“Consider a contract that pays $1 if Candidate X wins the presidential election in 2008.
If the market price of an X contract is currently 53 cents, an interpretation is that the
market ‘believes’ X has a 53% chance of winning” (Arrow et al. 2008).
Given the development of prediction markets, it is important to better understand
when prediction markets are expected to be biased at predicting future events. We say
that the prediction market is biased when its market equilibrium state price is different
from the mean probabilities of traders’ beliefs of the state (and unbiased otherwise).2
In this paper, we consider a simple prediction market in which risk averse traders have
heterogeneous beliefs in probabilities of different states and examine under which condition
the prediction market is biased. In other words, we study when the prediction market is
1See for instance Hahn and Tetlock (2006). Prediction markets have been used to forecast market
capitalization prior to an IPO (Berg et al. 2009), to test double auction in complex environments with
few traders (Healy et al. 2010), and to evaluate the information aggregation and manipulation behavior
(Jian and Sami 2012). See Goel, Reeves and Pennock (2009) for a more contrasted view about the
performance of prediction markets.
2This definition is consistent with the early economic papers on prediction markets (Slovic 2000
Forsythe et al. 1992, Hanson 2006 and Arrow et al. 2008) that compared the equilibrium price to the
mean beliefs of traders.
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not well calibrated on average (Page and Clemen 2013).
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature. Firstly, we derive the
exact necessary and sufficient condition for prediction market to be unbiased for general
distributions of beliefs. Specifically, we show that the binary prediction market is unbiased
for all distributions of beliefs on the states if and only if the utility function is logarithmic.
We also provide a sufficient condition on the prediction market to be unbiased for all utility
functions. In addition we present several examples in which the (joint) distributions of
traders’ beliefs, wealth and risk preferences lead to a systematic violation of the unbiased
prediction market. Secondly, when prediction market is biased, we provide indications
about the direction of the bias. Most significantly, we exhibit the necessary and sufficient
condition for the equilibrium price of a state to be always below/above the mean belief
of the state for all symmetric belief distributions, depending on risk preferences and the
mean beliefs. More precisely, for all symmetric beliefs, there exists a favorite-longshot
bias, meaning that the high-likelihood events (or states with the mean beliefs of the
states above 1/2) are underpriced and the low-likelihood events (or states with the mean
beliefs of the states below 1/2) are overpriced, if and only if the traders’ risk preferences
are such that twice absolute risk aversion is less than absolute prudence. Under constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) with risk aversion coefficient γ this condition is equivalent
to γ < 1. That is, when traders are less risk averse (than logarithmic utility), we provide
a rationale to the well documented favorite-longshot bias (Ali 1977). In contrast, there is
a reverse favorite-longshot bias when the utility functions of traders are either CARA or
CRRA with γ > 1. In a discussion on the extension of two state to many states prediction
market, we show with the help of an example that the equilibrium state price not only
depends on the distribution of beliefs about that state, but also about other states.
There is already a significant literature on the favorite-longshot bias in prediction
markets. Started with Ali (1977), many models have been developed to explain the
favorite-longshot bias, including Gjerstad (2004), Manski (2006), Wolfers and Zitzewitz
(2006), and Page and Clemen (2013). When traders are risk neutral and have limited
investment budgets, Manski (2006) presents a first formal analysis of this question. He
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shows that the equilibrium price of the prediction market can differ from the mean beliefs
of traders. When traders are risk averse, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) show theoretically
that the prediction market is unbiased when the utility function of traders is logarithmic.
Moreover, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) explore numerically how the equilibrium price is
affected by belief heterogeneity for several utility functions and several beliefs distribu-
tions.3 In this paper, we follow Manski (2006), Gjerstad (2004) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz
(2006) and show that the logarithmic utility is not only sufficient but also necessary to
ensure the prediction market to be unbiased for all belief distributions. More interestingly,
we provide the necessary and sufficient condition theoretically for the equilibrium prices
to be systemically biased to the mean beliefs of traders for all symmetric belief distribu-
tions. This condition depends critically on the risk preferences and the mean beliefs. It
provides a theoretical foundation to the numerical results in Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006)
and a complete characteristization of the theoretical results in Gjerstad (2004).
This paper is also related to but different from some recent papers providing an infor-
mational explanation to the favorite-longshot bias (Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2009, 2010,
2015). In a game-theoretic model of parimutuel betting, Ottaviani and Sorensen (2009)
assume that traders have a common prior but incorporate in a Bayesian fashion the in-
formation revealed by the bets placed at the equilibrium. This model is generalized in
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2010) to allow for noise and private information. Recently, Otta-
viani and Sorensen (2015) study the price underreaction when traders with heterogeneous
prior beliefs react to public information. In all these models, Ottaviani and Sorensen
derive theoretical conditions leading to the favorite-longshot bias in a binary prediction
market. A prediction market is a simple financial market. Therefore this paper is also
closely related to the models of asset pricing under heterogeneous beliefs (see, e.g., Varian
1985, Abel 1989, Jouini and Napp 2006 and 2007, Gollier 2007 and Roche 2011).4 These
3See Gjerstad (2004) for theoretical results under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility func-
tions, and some numerical results. See also Fountain and Harrison (2011) for further numerical results
with wealth and beliefs heterogeneity. Thaler and Ziemba (1988) extensively discuss the favorite-longshot
bias.
4For a justification and implications of these models, see for instance the literature survey papers by
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models with heterogeneous beliefs have been used to explain various anomalies in financial
markets.
We organize the paper as follows. In the next section we introduce a simple binary
prediction market model and derive a sufficient condition for the equilibrium state price
to be unique. In Section 3, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for prediction
market to be unbiased on the utility function for all heterogeneous beliefs. We also provide
a sufficient condition on prediction market to be unbiased for all utility functions. Then
in Section 4 we examine the conditions leading to the favorite-longshot bias. Finally in
Section 5 we provide a discussion on the generalization of the previous results in binary
prediction market to the market with more than two states. The last section concludes.
All the proofs are given in the appendices.
2 The model
We consider a simple binary prediction market in which risk averse traders can buy and
sell a risky asset paying $1 if a specific event or state occurs, and nothing otherwise. The
main assumption of the model is that the beliefs of the traders about the occurrence of
the specific event are heterogeneous. That is, we consider a model in which traders “agree
to disagree”, and therefore have different prior beliefs across states. Namely, the hetero-
geneity in beliefs does not come from asymmetric information but rather from intrinsic
differences in how traders interpret information. This assumption has been common in
economic models of prediction markets cited in the previous section. Moreover, to focus
on the specific effect of beliefs’ heterogeneity, we assume in all the Propositions of this
paper that the utility function and the wealth of traders are homogenous.5 In this section,
we derive some properties of the individual asset demand, and then of the equilibrium
price in this specific model.
Varian (1989), Scheinkman and Xiong (2004) and Hong and Stein (2007).
5The effect of heterogeneity in wealth and utility function on prediction market bias is more compli-
cated, see Remark 1 and Example 2 in the next section for a related discussion.
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In our model, each trader maximizes his expected utility based on his own beliefs.
Let u(·) be the trader’s vNM utility function, which is strictly increasing, strictly concave
and three times differentiable. Formally, when a trader decides how much to invest in the
financial asset paying $1 if the event occurs, he maximizes the following expected utility
max
α
[pu(w + α(1− π)) + (1− p)u(w − απ)], (1)
in which w is his initial wealth, p ∈ (0, 1) his subjective probability or belief that the
event occurs, α his asset demand and π the price of this asset.6 The first order condition
of this optimization is given by
p(1− π)u′(w + α(p, π)(1− π))− (1− p)πu′(w − α(p, π)π) = 0, (2)
in which α(p, π) is the solution of (2). Differentiating equation (2) with respect to p,
0 = (1− π)u′(w + α(p, π)(1− π)) + πu′(w − α(p, π)π)
+αp(p, π)[p(1− π)2u′′(w + α(p, π)(1− π))
+(1− p)π2u′′(w − α(p, π)π)], (3)
we obtain
αp(p, π) =
(1− π)u′(w + α(p, π)(1− π)) + πu′(w − α(p, π)π)
−p(1− π)2u′′(w + α(p, π)(1− π))− (1− p)π2u′′(w − α(p, π)π) > 0, (4)
that is, the asset demand increases with belief p. Since α(p, p) = 0, we conclude that
α(p, π) ≥ 0 if and only if p ≥ π. Namely, the trader buys (respectively sells) the asset
yielding $1 when the event occurs and 0 otherwise if and only if he assigns a probability
for this event higher (respectively lower) than the asset price.
Let p̃ be the random variable representing the distribution of beliefs on the event in
the population of traders, and let π∗ be the equilibrium price. The equilibrium condition
6The individual asset demand α can be seen as the net asset demand of one asset in a model with
two Arrow-Debreu assets. To see that, let αs and πs denote respectively the demand for and the price of
Arrow-Debreu assets in state s = 1, 2. The objective can then be written: maxα1,α2 [pu(w+ α1 − π1α1 −
π2α2) + (1 − p)u(w + α2 − π1α1 − π2α2)]. Denoting α = α1 − α2 and observing that π1 + π2 = 1 by
arbitrage then leads (with π = π1) to (1).
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is
Eα(p̃, π∗) = 0, (5)
in which E denotes the expectation operator with respect to p̃, the belief distribution
of traders on the event.7 Our main objective is to compare π∗ to Ep̃. In particular, in
Section 3 we derive condition so that prediction market is unbiased when π∗ = Ep̃. Since
α(p, p) = 0, notice immediately that, when p̃ is degenerate and equal to homogeneous
belief p with probability 1, then π∗ = p and there is no trade at the equilibrium. This is
a trivial case always leading to unbiased prediction market. We rule out this case (until
Section 5 with more than two states), and consider nondegenerate p̃ in the following.
It is easy to see that an equilibrium always exists in such a prediction market. Indeed,
when π tends to 0 (respectively tends to 1) α(p, π) becomes positive (respectively negative)
for all p, so its expectation over p̃ also becomes positive (respectively negative). Therefore
when π increases, the function Eα(p̃, π) must go from a positive to a negative region and
thus cross zero somewhere in between at least once.
We first discuss the uniqueness of the equilibrium, that is whether Eα(p̃, π) only crosses
the origin once. We know that α(p, π) has this single crossing property at π = p. But
that does not guarantee that Eα(p̃, π) also has the single crossing property, as illustrated
by the following example.
Example 1 (Multiple equilibria): Consider traders with a quadratic utility function
u(w) = −(1 − w)2 for 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 and initial wealth w = 1/2. Following the first order
condition the optimal asset demand is then equal to α(p, π) = p−π
2(p−2pπ+π2)
. In a prediction
market with only two traders with respective beliefs of the event denoted p1 = 0.1 and
p2 = 0.9, the equilibrium condition is equivalent to 9− 68π+150π2 − 100π3 = 0. Solving
for this equation, it is found that there are three equilibrium prices in this prediction
market: π∗ = (0.235, 0.5, 0.764).
7The distribution of traders’ beliefs can be discrete or continuous.
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A sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium however is απ(p, π) < 0
everywhere. Indeed, this implies that the function Eα(p̃, π) is strictly decreasing in π,
and therefore crosses zero at most once. Differentiating (2) with respect to π, we have
απ(p, π) = (6)
−pu′(w + α(p, π)(1− π))− (1− p)u′(w − α(p, π)π)
−p(1− π)2u′′(w + α(p, π)(1− π))− (1− p)π2u′′(w − α(p, π)π)
−α(p, π) p(1− π)u
′′(w + α(p, π)(1− π))− (1− p)πu′′(w − α(p, π)π)
−p(1− π)2u′′(w + α(p, π)(1− π))− (1− p)π2u′′(w − α(p, π)π) .
The first term is strictly negative but the second term is of ambiguous sign under risk
aversion, so that the demand may increase when the price π increases, as it is the case
in Example 1. We now provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness by ensuring that the
second term is also negative. We show that this is the case under decreasing absolute risk
aversion (DARA).
Proposition 1 The equilibrium price π∗ is unique if u satisfies the assumption of DARA.
This result is consistent with Proposition 4 of Ottaviani and Sorensen (2015), although
it is obtained in a different setting here. The intuition for this result is the following.
When the price of an asset increases, there are two effects captured by the two terms of
the right hand side of equation (6). First, there is a substitution effect that leads to a
decrease in its demand, but there is also a wealth effect that may potentially increase
its demand. Intuitively, as the terminal wealth distribution deteriorates, the investor’s
attitude towards risk may change, and this wealth effect might prove sufficiently strong to
increase the demand for the risky asset, as initially shown by Fishburn and Porter (1976)
in the case of a first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) shift. Under DARA however,
the negative wealth effect leads the trader to be more risk averse, and therefore further
decreases the demand for the risky asset. Under constant absolute risk aversion (CARA),
there is no wealth effect, and only the first negative effect is at play. Finally, we note
that Example 1 features multiple equilibria because the quadratic utility function has
increasing absolute risk aversion.
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When there is a unique equilibrium, one can make a simple comment on the effect of a
change in the distribution of beliefs on the equilibrium price. Indeed, from the equilibrium
condition Eα(p̃, π∗) = 0 and αp(p, π) > 0, any FSD improvement in the distribution of
beliefs must increase the equilibrium price.
3 A necessary and sufficient condition for unbiased
prediction market
In this section, we characterize the unbiased prediction market by answering the following
question: which utility functions lead to unbiased prediction market for any belief distri-
bution? Correspondingly, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for prediction
market to be unbiased.
To answer the question, we consider a logarithmic utility function8 u(w) = logw
(which displays DARA). We can obtain a closed-form solution of the first order condition
(2):
α(p, π) = w
(p− π)
π(1− π) .
This implies that the equilibrium condition (5) can simply be written π∗ = Ep̃. This shows
that the logarithmic utility function is sufficient for prediction market to be unbiased, a
result obtained in Gjerstad (2004) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006). A natural question
is whether the utility function must be logarithmic to guarantee prediction market to be
unbiased independently of belief distribution among traders or whether this is possible
for other utility functions. That is whether u(w) = logw is also a necessary condition.
We show that this is indeed the case.
Proposition 2 We have π∗ = Ep̃ for all belief distributions p̃ if and only if u(w) = logw.
8Since the expected utility theory is defined up to an affine transformation, the statement u(w) = logw
should read in fact u(w) = a logw + b for constants a (> 0) and b. A similar observation applies for all
utility functions used in the Examples and for the results of Section 5.
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This result characterizes unbiased prediction market that is independent of belief dis-
tribution among traders. It is a knife edge case for the prediction bias examined in the
next section. We complement this result with three remarks about its limitation in more
general settings.
Remark 1 (Wealth heterogeneity): The result of Proposition 2 cannot be generalized
to non-identical wealth, as possible correlation between wealth and beliefs would invali-
date the result. Indeed, let w̃ be the random variable representing wealth heterogeneity.





Therefore there is no utility function that can always ensure prediction market to be
unbiased when beliefs and wealth are potentially correlated. Observe that, despite this
impossibility result, the direction of the bias can be inferred if the analyst knows the sign of
the correlation between beliefs and wealth. The intuition for (7) is that richer individuals
invest more, and therefore have more influence on the equilibrium price. Thus, if wealth
is positively (respectively negatively) correlated with beliefs, the equilibrium price will be
higher (respectively lower). This result is closely related but different from the example
with logarithmic preferences of Ottaviani and Sorensen (2015) who show that, even with
logarithmic utility, the equilibrium price can underreact to information, leading to biased
price from the mean beliefs when traders with heterogeneous prior beliefs react to the
information in the same way.
Remark 2 (Stakes): Suppose each trader has a (positive or negative) stake ∆ in the
event he predicts, so that he now maximizes over α the following expected utility
pu(w +∆+ α(1− π)) + (1− p)u(w − απ).
Then it is easy to understand that the result of Proposition 2 is not guaranteed either.
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Indeed for the logarithmic utility function we have









The intuition is that when there is a positive (respectively negative) stake, the marginal
utility decreases (respectively increases) if the event occurs. As a result, the traders want
to transfer wealth to the state in which the event does not occur (respectively occurs), and
they typically use the prediction market as a hedging scheme to do this. The consequence
is that the equilibrium is biased downward (respectively upward). Observe that if the
stakes are individual-dependent but uncorrelated with beliefs, and if their mean across
individuals is equal to zero, then we retrieve prediction market to be unbiased under a
logarithmic utility function.
The previous proposition provides the condition on the utility function so that market
prediction is unbiased for all belief distribution p̃. We now study the dual problem: what
are the conditions on belief distribution p̃ to ensure prediction market to be unbiased for
all utility function u? We show that this depends on whether the probability distribution
of beliefs is symmetric about one half.
Proposition 3 If p̃ is symmetric about 1/2, then π∗ = Ep̃ for all u that imply a unique
equilibrium.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is simple. When p̃ is symmetric about one half, the
two states are formally indistinguishable. Therefore it cannot be that the price of an asset
yielding one dollar in one state is different from that of an asset yielding one dollar in the
other state, implying π∗ = 1/2.
We note, however, that if heterogeneity in individual utility functions is introduced,
prediction market bias may arise even when p̃ is symmetric about 1/2. The intuition is
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essentially the same as the one presented in Remark 1. This is illustrated by the following
example which considers heterogeneity over (constant absolute) risk aversion.
Example 2 (Heterogeneous CARA): Let ui(w) = −e−riw in which ri > 0 represents the
CARA coefficient of trader i = 1, 2 with respective beliefs p1 = 0.1 and p2 = 0.9 of the
event. Under positive correlation between beliefs and risk aversion (r1, r2) = (1, 3), we
have π∗ = 1/4 < 1/2 = Ep̃, while under negative correlation (r1, r2) = (3, 1), we have
π∗ = 3/4 > 1/2 = Ep̃.
We have characterized conditions for prediction market to be unbiased for all belief
distribution p̃ in Proposition 2 and provided a sufficient condition for all utility function u
in Proposition 3. We can see that these conditions are rather stringent. We note, however,
that one can relax these conditions in the sense that it is possible to find well-chosen pairs
(u, p̃) also yielding unbiased prediction market. This is shown in the following example
which uses a specific constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function and a specific
nonsymmetric distribution of beliefs.
Example 3 (Unbiased prediction market under CRRA and nonsymmetric beliefs). Con-
sider traders with utility function u(w) = −1/w. Two groups of traders participate in the
prediction market: one group has beliefs p1 = p, and the other group has beliefs p2 = 1−p.
Denoting a the proportion of traders in the first group, we have Ep̃ = ap+(1− a)(1− p).
Note that the belief distribution among traders may not be symmetric about 1/2. One
may then easily obtain that Eα(p̃, π) = 0 implies
√
π(1− π){ap+(1−a)(1−p)−π} = 0
leading to π∗ = Ep̃. This example shows a different result from the price underreaction to
information obtained in Ottaviani and Sorensen (2015). This illustrates the importance
of information and heterogeneous concordant beliefs.
Examples 2 and 3 indicate that symmetric beliefs about 1/2 is neither necessary nor
sufficient for prediction market to be unbiased in general, in particular when traders have
heterogeneous risk preference.
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4 A necessary and sufficient condition for the favorite-
longshot bias
In the previous analysis, we have examined under which conditions the prediction market
is unbiased in the sense that the equilibrium price π∗ is equal to the mean belief Ep̃. We
have seen that these conditions are rather stringent, implying a bias of the equilibrium
price to the mean belief is expected in prediction markets in general (Ottaviani and
Sorensen, 2015). It is therefore interesting to see how to characterize such bias. In this
section, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for prediction bias, meaning that
the equilibrium price π∗ is systematically above or below the mean belief Ep̃.
The analysis developed in this section may provide a rationale for the favorite-longshot
bias, namely for the empirical observation that longshots tend to be over-valued and that
favorites tend to be under-valued (Ali 1977). More explicitly, consider a horse race with
only two horses, and call the first horse the favorite (resp. longshot) if the mean beliefs that
this horse wins are such that Ep̃ ≥ 1/2 (resp. Ep̃ ≤ 1/2). As we will see, the necessary
and sufficient condition so that this horse is under-valued, i.e. π∗ ≤ Ep̃, critically depends
on whether it is a favorite or a longshot and on the risk aversion of traders. This result
is presented in the following Proposition 4 in which A(w) = −u′′(w)/u′(w) denotes the
Arrow-Pratt’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion and P (w) = −u′′′(w)/u′′(w) denotes the
coefficient of absolute prudence (Kimball 1990). Essentially, these coefficients respectively
capture the intensity with which the utility and the decisions are affected by a change in
risk.
Proposition 4 We have π∗ ≥ Ep̃ for all symmetric beliefs 9 p̃ about the mean belief
Ep̃ if and only if (1/2 − Ep̃)(P (w) − 2A(w)) ≥ 0 for all w and u that imply a unique
equilibrium.
9Here the symmetry is about the mean probability of state 1; for example, p̃ = (1/3− 1/6, 1/3, 1/3+
1/6) of three traders’ beliefs on the probability of state 1 is a symmetric belief about the mean probability
1/3 of state 1.
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The difference between the mean belief Ep̃ and the equilibrium price π∗ therefore de-
pends on whether the mean belief is less than 1/2, and on whether the absolute prudence
is greater than twice the absolute risk aversion. The sign of P −2A is a familiar condition
on utility functions derived from comparative statics analysis within expected utility mod-
els (Gollier 2001). In particular, for CARA utility functions, P = A(< 2A). For CRRA
utility functions u(x) = x1−γ/(1 − γ), P < 2A is equivalent to the constant relative risk
aversion γ > 1, while P > 2A is equivalent to γ < 1, and P = 2A is equivalent to γ = 1,
which corresponds to the logarithmic utility function.
Figure 1: The equilibrium price π∗ as a function of mean beliefs p. Under symmetric
beliefs, there is a “favorite-longshot bias” for the class of utility functions u satisfying
P (w) > 2A(w).
The result in Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 1. The horizontal axis represents
the mean belief Ep̃ and the vertical axis represents the equilibrium price p̄ = π∗. The
diagonal therefore represents prediction market accuracy, which holds everywhere if and
only if P = 2A (i.e., u is logarithmic). The result therefore shows that there is a favorite-
longshot bias if and only if the utility function displays P > 2A, or equivalently γ < 1
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for the CRRA utility functions. This implies that, for all symmetric belief distributions,
there is a longshot bias if and only if the traders are less risk averse (than the logarithmic
utility function). When the traders are more risk averse, a reverse longshot bias occurs.
Therefore, we provide a theoretical foundation for the favorite-longshot bias. The result
also generalizes the numerical simulations presented in Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) for
CRRA utility functions and a set of specific distributions of beliefs.
Observe that the result in Proposition 4 is consistent with Propositions 2 and 3.
Indeed, this result shows that prediction market is unbiased under two extreme and
separate conditions on the utility functions and the distribution of beliefs: either as in
Proposition 2 when the utility is logarithmic (P = 2A) or as in Proposition 3 when mean
beliefs equal one half for symmetric belief distributions.
When traders are risk neutral, Ottaviani and Sorensen (2015, Proposition 2 and Corol-
lary 1) show that underreaction leads to the favorite-longshot bias under the assumption
of bounded wealth. They show that underreaction and hence the favorite-longshot bias
becomes more pronounced for wider heterogeneous beliefs (measured by mean preserving
spread). When traders are risk averse, Ottaviani and Sorensen (2015, Proposition 6) show
a sufficient condition on price underreaction to information is the strict DARA, which is
equivalent to P > A. They further illustrate the favorite-longshot bias for logarithmic
utility. For CARA utility characterized by P = A, they show that there is no price un-
derreaction. For all symmetric beliefs, the condition P > 2A for the favorite-longshot
bias in Proposition 4 is not only sufficient but also necessary. This result is different
from Ottaviani and Sorensen (2015, Proposition 6). In particular, when A ≤ P < 2A
(including CARA utility), we obtain a reverse favorite-longshot bias. Therefore our re-
sults on the favorite-longshot bias in Proposition 4 complements the price underreaction
to information in Ottaviani and Sorensen (2015).
One may wonder whether the condition (1/2−Ep̃)(P (w)− 2A(w)) ≥ 0 is also neces-
sary and sufficient for all distributions p̃, not only symmetric ones. To see this, note first
that π∗ ≥ Ep̃ is equivalent to Eα(p̃, p) ≥ 0, and since α(p, p) = 0, by Jensen’s inequality
the necessary and sufficient condition for all p̃ is simply given by αpp(p, p) ≥ 0 for all p
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and p. The computation of αpp(p, p) (in (A.1) of Appendix A) shows that the condition
(1/2−Ep̃)(P (w)−2A(w)) ≥ 0 is indeed necessary for the favorite-longshot bias. However
this condition is not sufficient, as the following example shows.
Example 4 (Nonsymmetric beliefs): Consider two groups of traders with u(w) =
√
w
(i.e., P > 2A) and heterogeneous beliefs p1 = 0.1 and p2 = 0.9. When the proportion
of traders with beliefs p1 = 0.1 is 75% then π
∗ = 0.272 < Ep̃ = 0.3 (i.e., the longshot
is undervalued), and when the proportion of traders with beliefs p1 = 0.1 is 25% then
π∗ = 0.727 > Ep̃ = 0.7 (i.e., the favorite is overvalued).
We believe that the general results and selected numerical examples presented so far
provide a fairly complete picture of the properties of equilibrium prices of a prediction
market in the two-state case. This is the case that has been usually considered in the
handful of theoretical papers on prediction markets that we have found in the literature.
We next extend our discussion to a prediction market with more than two states.
5 A discussion on the prediction market with many
states
We have so far considered a prediction market with only two states. In this section we
provide a discussion on unbiased prediction market for any finite number S of states with
S > 2. We examine whether the previous results obtained for two states can be generalized
to the case with more than two states. Consistent with previous notations, we denote
by the vector pi = (pi1, ..., pis, · · · , piS) the trader i’s beliefs over states s = 1, ..., S for
i = 1, 2, · · · , N , and by πs the equilibrium price of state s. Similar to the two-state case,





As indicated in Section 3, a well-known result in the literature is that under a loga-
rithmic utility function u(w) = logw prediction market is unbiased in the 2−state case
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(Gjerstad 2004, Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2006). It turns out that this sufficiency result can
be generalized in the sense that all S state prices equal the mean of traders’ beliefs for
each state under u(w) = logw. Since we have shown in Section 3 that u(w) = logw is
also necessary for prediction market to be unbiased in the 2−state case, we can therefore
state the following result.
Proposition 5 (Generalization of Proposition 2) Prediction market is unbiased for all
distributions of beliefs in the general S−state case if and only if u(w) = logw.
This result should not suggest, however, that the previous results can be directly gen-
eralized to the S−state case. Consider the previous observation that if all traders have the
same beliefs about a particular state (and hence the same beliefs about the other state),
then the market is unbiased. This result is no longer valid in the general case. Indeed,
we next show with the help of an example that, even if all traders have the homogeneous
belief over one state, the equilibrium price of that state could nevertheless be different
from its homogeneous belief.
Example 5 (Prediction market bias under homogeneous beliefs of a state): Let N = 2
and S = 3, and assume the following traders’ beliefs: p1 = (1 − 2p, p − ǫ, p + ǫ)
and p2 = (1 − 2p, p + ǫ, p − ǫ). Observe that the two traders have homogeneous be-






> 1− 2p for any ǫ 6= 0.
We now make another observation using the previous example. With the same nu-
merical values for individual beliefs and utilities, we consider an alternative prediction
market. Assume that there are only two Arrow-Debreu assets: an asset that pays $1 if
state 1 occurs, and another asset that pays $1 if either state 2 or state 3 occurs. We have
therefore a binary prediction market. But since the traders’ beliefs over the two states
(1− 2p, 2p) are now homogeneous, we obviously retrieve the unbiased prediction market.
Therefore, this simple observation shows that the equilibrium state price varies depending
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on the number of states on which it is possible to bet. In other words, this means that
the “design” of the prediction market matters for equilibrium state prices.10 This makes
sense since the design of the prediction market may affect trading opportunities under
heterogeneous beliefs. Following this observation, one may ask: when is an equilibrium
state price always independent from the design of the prediction market? It can be easily
shown that this is the case when all traders believe that all other S− 1 states are equally
likely (see Proposition 6 below).
Example 5 also shows that the equilibrium price of one state depends on the distri-
bution of beliefs in other states (through the parameter ǫ). Note that this is inconsistent
with a result in Varian (1985) stating that the equilibrium price in state s depends only on
the distributions of subjective probabilities that the state will occur.11 One may therefore
ask: when does the equilibrium price of one state depend only on the beliefs about that
state? Interestingly the answer to this question is exactly the same as the one to the
question asked above about the prediction market design. Indeed, if the equilibrium price
of one state in a S−state prediction market is always equal to the equilibrium price of
that state in a prediction market, this precisely means that the distribution of beliefs in
all the other states is irrelevant for that equilibrium state price. We state this result in
the following proposition.
Proposition 6 For all u, the equilibrium price of one state, say π1 for s = 1, in a
S−state prediction market only depends on the beliefs about that state pi1 if and only if
10To illustrate this interpretation, consider the horse race illustration. Example 5 and the last observa-
tion indicate that in a race with S > 2 horses, the equilibrium state price that one specific horse wins the
race depends on whether it is possible to place bets separately on each of the other horses participating
in the race.
11Varian’s result is obtained in a S−state complete market setting with heterogeneous beliefs and het-
erogeneous initial wealth. Our prediction market model in this section is thus a particular case of Varian’s
model since we assume a common initial wealth (thus removing any initial risk-sharing motivations for
trade). Therefore Varian’s result should also apply to our simpler setting. Note that Ingersoll (1987,
p. 214) also presents a similar result as that of Varian: “The Arrow-Debreu price for an insurable state
depends only on agregate wealth in that state and the pattern of beliefs about that state”.
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pis = pi for all s = 2, ..., S, and for all i = 1, ..., N (i.e. if and only if states 2 to S are
judged as equally likely by all traders).
Example 5 has shown that prediction market may be biased despite homogeneous
beliefs in that state. The next example shows the dual result that prediction market may
be unbiased despite heterogeneous beliefs. Specifically, Example 6 identifies a case with
symmetric beliefs where prediction market is unbiased for any CRRA utility functions.
Example 6 (Prediction market is unbiased under heterogeneous beliefs): Let N = 2 and
S = 3, and assume the following traders’ beliefs: p1 = (1/2 + 1/4, 1/3− 1/6, 1/6− 1/12)
and p2 = (1/2−1/4, 1/3+1/6, 1/6+1/12). Then under u(w) = w1−γ/(1−γ) with γ > 0,
prediction market is unbiased for all states, i.e., π1 = 1/2, π2 = 1/3 and π3 = 1/6.
Proposition 4 implies for symmetric beliefs of two-state and under CRRA utility func-
tions that there is underpricing if and only if γ > 1, and thus that prediction market
is unbiased only in the knife-edge logarithmic case, i.e. γ = 1. In contrast, Example 6
illustrates that the equilibrium state price can be an unbiased estimation of the mean
beliefs even when beliefs are symmetric and P 6= 2A. Hence the prediction market bias
in S−state markets can be very different from 2-state markets.
6 Conclusion
In the last decades, academics as well as private-sector operators have increasingly used
financial prediction markets with the primary objective to better predict future uncertain
events. But under which conditions should prediction markets be biased?
This paper has derived generic theoretical conditions so that equilibrium state prices
in prediction markets is biased from the mean of the beliefs of traders. We have shown
that even in a setting with homogenous traders, the conditions on risk preferences and/or
on distributions of beliefs that lead to biased prediction market. We also provided a set of
additional conditions that are informative about how prediction market prices vary with
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the belief distributions and the utility functions of participants as well as with the “design”
of the prediction market. In particular, the paper has identified an exact condition on risk
aversion such that the favorite-longshot bias (Ali 1977) always holds for any symmetric
belief distributions, and an exact condition on beliefs such that the equilibrium price of
one state only depends on the heterogeneity of beliefs about that state (Varian 1985).
A central assumption in our model is that traders do not update their subjective
probabilities. With that assumption, we have followed the common setting adopted in
the early economic papers on prediction markets (Gjerstad 2004, Manski 2006, Wolfers
and Zitzewitz 2006). We believe that we have in turn provided in this paper a fairly
complete picture of prediction market bias in this specific setting. In a set of important
papers, Ottaviani and Sorensen (2009, 2010, 2015) provide an alternative informational
explanation to the prediction market bias without relaxing standard Bayesian updating.
For sure, in many environments, investors do update their beliefs based on new informa-
tion. On the other hand, there is a lot of evidence that people are not Bayesian. Typically,
the extensive research on the “confirmation bias” in psychology show that people tend to
search for, interpret or recall information in a way that confirms their prior beliefs. This
suggests that the mechanism underlying the prediction market bias may depend on the
specific prediction market characteristics and participants. Ultimately, this is an empir-
ical question. Since our paper identifies a simple mechanism that relates the prediction
market bias to traders’ risk preferences, we believe that it can provide a good basis for
empirical testing.
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Appendix A: Proof of Propositions 1-4
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We are done if we can show that the second term of the right hand side in (6) is negative.
As this is simple to show, we only provide a sketch of the proof. Let x̃ = (1 − π,−π; p)
denote a random variable x̃ which takes values of 1− π and −π with probabilities p and
1 − p, respectively. Then the first order condition (2) can be written more compactly
E[x̃u′(w + αx̃)] = 0. We thus are done if we can show that this last equality implies
−αE[x̃u′′(w+αx̃)] ≤ 0, that is, the second term of the right hand side in (6) is negative.
Then it is direct to see that this implication means that −u′ is more risk averse than u,
which is equivalent to nonincreasing absolute risk aversion. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We just need to prove the necessity. Namely, let p = Ep̃, we must show that if Eα(p̃, p) = 0
for all p̃, then u(w) = logw. Since Eα(p̃, p) = 0 for all belief distribution p̃, this must
also hold for a specific class of probability distribution in p̃. We consider the class of
“small” risk, that is we assume that p̃ is close enough to p in the sense of a second-order
approximation: Eα(p̃, π) = α(p, π) + 0.5E(p̃− p)2αpp(p, π). Using this last equality, the
necessary condition Eα(p̃, p) = 0 implies α(p, p) + 0.5E(p̃ − p)2αpp(p, p) = 0. Since for
all p, we have α(p, p) = 0, the necessary condition becomes αpp(p, p) = 0. Differentiating
again (3) with respect to p to compute αpp(p, p) we obtain
0 = 2αp(p, π){(1− π)2u′′(w + α(p, π)(1− π))− π2u′′(w − α(p, π)π)}
+ αpp(p, π){p(1− π)2u′′(w + α(p, π)(1− π)) + (1− p)π2u′′(w − α(p, π)π)}
+ αp(p, π)
2{p(1− π)3u′′′(w + α(p, π)(1− π))− (1− p)π3u′′′(w − α(p, π)π)}.
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. Finally, integrating this differential
equation gives u(w) = logw. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We want to show that if p̃ is symmetric about 1/2 then Ep̃ = π∗ for all u. Observe
from the first order condition (2) that α(p, π) = −α(1 − p, 1 − π). This implies that the
equilibrium condition can be written Eα(p̃, π∗) = Eα(1 − p̃, 1 − π∗) = 0. Observe then
that p̃ symmetric about 1/2 means that p̃ is distributed as 1− p̃. Consequently the equi-
librium condition implies Eα(p̃, π∗) = Eα(p̃, 1− π∗). Since the equilibrium is assumed to
be unique, this last condition implies π∗ = 1− π∗, that is π∗ = 1/2 = Ep̃. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Recall that, when the equilibrium is unique, π∗ ≥ p if and only if Eα(p̃, p) ≥ 0. For
symmetric distributions, this holds true if and only if for all p (hereafter denoted p) we
have
g(δ) = α(p+ δ, p) + α(p− δ, p) ≥ 0, (A.2)
in which α(p+ δ, p) is the unique solution of
(p+ δ)(1− p)u′(w + α(p+ δ, p)(1− p))− (1− p− δ)pu′(w − α(p+ δ, p)p) = 0 (A.3)
and α(p− δ, p) is the unique solution of
(p− δ)(1− p)u′(w + α(p− δ, p)(1− p))− (1− p+ δ)pu′(w − α(p− δ, p)p) = 0 (A.4)
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for δ ∈ [0,min{p, 1− p}].
Observe that g(0) = 0 and g′(0) = 0. Moreover, we have g′′(0) = 2αpp(p, p). Then,
taking αpp(p, p) from (A.1), we can see that g
′′(0) ≥ 0 is equivalent to (1/2− p)(P (w)−
2A(w)) ≥ 0 for all w. This provides the necessity part of the Proposition.
We now prove the sufficiency. From (A.4), condition (A.2) is equivalent to
(p− δ)(1− p)u′(w − α(p+ δ, p)(1− p))− (1− p+ δ)pu′(w + α(p+ δ, p)p) ≥ 0. (A.5)
Denoting φ(x) = 1/u′(x) and α = α(p+ δ, p) ≥ 0, π∗ ≥ p is therefore satisfied if
(p+ δ)(1− p)φ(w − αp)− (1− p− δ)pφ(w + α(1− p)) = 0 (A.6)
implies
(p− δ)(1− p)φ(w + αp)− (1− p+ δ)pφ(w − α(1− p)) ≥ 0. (A.7)





w + αp, p−δ
2p






w + α(1− p), 1−p−δ
2(1−p)
w − α(1− p), 1−p+δ
2(1−p)
.
Then it can be verified that Ex̃ = Eỹ = w−αδ and x̃ is a mean-preserving spread of ỹ if
and only if p ≥ 1/2. Note that φ′′(x) ≥ 0 if and only if P ≤ 2A. Therefore, when p ≥ 1/2
and P ≤ 2A, we have
Eφ(x̃) ≥ Eφ(ỹ), (A.8)









(1− p− δ)φ(w + α(1− p)) + (1− p+ δ)φ(w − α(1− p))
]
.
This last inequality then leads to
(1− p)(p− δ)φ(w + αp)− p(1− p+ δ)φ(w − α(1− p))
≥−
[




where the last equality is given by (A.6). This shows that the condition (A.7) is satisfied.
Hence π∗ ≥ p when p ≥ 1/2 and P ≤ 2A. Moreover, when p ≤ 1/2, ỹ is a mean-preserving
spread of x̃, and φ′′(x) ≤ 0 is equivalent to (A.8), leading to π∗ ≥ p. The case π∗ ≤ p
under (1/2−p)(P−2A) ≤ 0 can be demonstrated in an analogous fashion. This concludes
the proof. 
Appendix B: Proof of Results in Section 5
In this appendix, we setup a S-state prediction market, derive the equilibrium state prices,
and provide the proofs of the propositions and details of the examples in Section 5.
B.1 The S-state model
Consider a prediction market with N traders, indexed by i = 1, · · · , N , and S states,
indexed by s = 1, · · · , S. Traders have the same utility function u(·), however they have
heterogeneous beliefs in the probability distribution over the states of nature, denoted
by pi = (pi1, pi2, · · · , piS) for trader i. Let πs be the price of the Arrow-Debreu asset s
that delivers $1 in state s and $0 in other states for s = 1, · · · , S. Trader i chooses a
portfolio αi = (αi1, · · · , αiS) of the Arrow-Debreu assets to maximize his expected utility




i(wis) = λiπs, (B.1)
where λi is the Lagrange multiplier,
wis = wo + αis −
S∑
j=1
πjαij , i = 1, · · · , N ; s = 1, · · · , S
is the portfolio wealth of trader i in state s, and wo is the initial wealth.
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B.2 The equilibrium state prices
Based on the setup in subsection B.1, the equilibrium state prices {πs} are determined
by the market clearing condition
N∑
i=1
αis = 0, s = 1, · · · , S.
To derive the equilibrium state prices, we consider three types of utility functions and the
results are summarized in three Lemmas.






pis, s = 1, · · · , S, (B.2)
that is, the state price is the mean probability belief of traders in the state.
Proof : With u(x) = log(x), the FOC (B.1) becomes








, i = 1, · · · , N ; s = 1, · · · , S, (B.3)
which leads to









, s = 1, · · · , S.
Substituting the above expressions into (B.3) for s = S, we obtain that λi = wo. This
implies that the Lagrange multiplier λi is a constant in this case. Applying the market
clearing condition to (B.3) then leads to the equilibrium state prices (B.2). 












for s = 1, · · · , S. (B.4)
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Proof : With u(x) = −e−rx/r, the FOC (B.1) becomes
pis
πs
















, s = 1, · · · , S. (B.5)











, s = 1, · · · , S, (B.6)






i=1 log(pis) for s = 1, · · · , S. Also, from (B.5),























= rwo + log(λi), i = 1, · · · , N. (B.8)





























, s = 1, · · · , S.






s=1 πsβ = β. 














)1/γ , s = 1, · · · , S. (B.10)
27
Proof : With the CRRA utility function, the FOC (B.1) becomes u′(wis) = w
−γ
is =






. This, together with wis = wo +
αis −
∑S
k=1 πkαik, leads to










Equation (B.11) implies that, for s = 1, · · · , S,























, i = 1, · · · , N (B.13)











, s = 1, · · · , S. (B.14)
Combining (B.13) with (B.14) leads to the state prices πs in (B.10). 
B.3 Proofs of Propositions 5 and 6
The proof of Proposition 5 follows easily from the equilibrium state prices (B.2) in Lemma
1 for u(x) = log(x). To prove Proposition 6, we first show that pis = pi for s = 2, ..., S and
i = 1, ..., N implies π2,S =
∑S
s=2 πs, where π2,S denote the state price of an Arrow-Debreu
security that delivers $1 if either state j = 2, ..., S occurs and $0 if state 1 occurs. If






, for all i = 1, ..., N and j, k = 2, ..., S.
Assume then by contradiction that πj > πk for some j, k = 2, ..., S and j 6= k. This
implies wij < wik, and hence αij < αik for all i = 1, ..., N . The last inequality cannot
hold at the equilibrium due to the market clearing condition. As a result we must have
πj = πk ≡ π for all j = 2, ..., S. It is immediate that each trader i must demand the same
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amount, say αi, for j, k = 2, ..., S. The problem of each trader i is then to select αi1 and
αi to maximize
pi1u(w + αi1 − αi1π1 − αi(S − 1)π) + (1− pi1)u(w + αi − αi1π1 − αi(S − 1)π).
This is equivalent to a binary-prediction market in which (S−1)π denotes the equilibrium
price of an Arrow-Debreu security that delivers $1 if either state j = 2, ..., S occurs.
Therefore we have
∑S
j=2 πj = (S − 1)π = π2,S. This implies the S-state problem is
equivalent to a reduced two-state problem by combining states 2 to S into one state.
Thus the equilibrium price of state 1 only depends on the beliefs of the state.
We now show that if there exists an individual i who assigns different probabilities
for two states j, k = 2, ..., S then we may always have π2,S 6=
∑S
j=2 πj. Consider a
simple example with 3 states and 2 traders, with the following structure of beliefs: p1 =
(1− 2p1, p1, p1) and p2 = (1− 2p2, p2 + e, p2 − e). Namely trader 1 judges states 2 and 3
as equally likely, while trader 2 judges states 2 and 3 as equally likely if and only if e = 0.
With CARA preferences, in the three-state prediction market we use the equilibrium








3) for i = 1, 2, 3 with
p∗1 =
√
(1− 2p1)(1− 2p2), p∗2 =
√




p1(p2 − e). However, in the
two-state prediction market where states 2 and 3 are combined into one state, the beliefs
p1 and p2 become p̄1 = (1 − 2p1, 2p1) and p̄2 = (1 − 2p2, 2p2), respectively. Hence

















(1− 2p1)(1− 2p2) and p̄∗2,3 = 2
√
p1p2. Therefore
π̄2,3 = π2 + π3 for all p1 and p2 if and only if e = 0. A similar example can be generated
for any arbitrary number of states. This completes the proof of Proposition 6.
B.4 Proofs of the results in Examples 5 and 6
In Example 5 with CARA utility function, we apply the equilibrium state price (B.4) in
Lemma 2 to traders’ beliefs and obtain that p∗1 = 1− 2p and p∗2 = p∗3 =
√
p2 − ǫ2, leading
to the state price π1 in the example.
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To show the result in Example 6, we apply the equilibrium state prices (B.10) in
Lemma 3 for CRRA utility function. With g = −1/γ, the state prices πs for s = 1, 2, 3


































With the specified heterogeneous probabilities, ∆1 = (12)










Correspondingly, equations (B.15)-(B.17) lead to
2(π1)
−g = 9−g/δ1 + 3
−g/δ2, (B.18)
2(π2)
−g = 2−g/δ1 + 6
−g/δ2, (B.19)
2(π3)
−g = 1/δ1 + 3
−g/δ2, (B.20)















Substituting (B.21) and (B.22) into (B.23), we obtain
[3g + 3−g][π1 − (3/2)π2]πg1πg2 = 3(2/3)1+gπ1+2g2 [(π1/π2)1+2g − (3/2)1+2g],
leading to π1 = (3/2)π2.
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as well as seminar and conference participants at ESEM 2011, SCE 2011, BFS 2012, FIRN
2012, Paris-Dauphine and University of Technology Sydney (UTS) for comments. The
first version of this paper was written while Nicolas Treich visited UTS in 2010. Financial
support from the Quantitative Finance Research Center and the Paul Woolley Center at
UTS is gratefully acknowledged. Tony He acknowledges funding for his subsequent visit in
2011 to Toulouse from the European Research Council under the European Community’s
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) Grant Agreement no. 230589 and fi-
nancial support from the Australian Research Council (ARC) under a Discovery Grant
(DP130103210). Nicolas Treich also thanks the chair “Marché des risques et création de
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